From Neglect to Protection: Attitudes towards Whistleblowers in the European Institutions (1957–2002) by Gijsenbergh, Joris
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 281–291
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v9i1.3944
Article
From Neglect to Protection: Attitudes towards Whistleblowers in the
European Institutions (1957–2002)
Joris Gijsenbergh
Faculty of Law, Radboud University, 6525 HR Nijmegen, The Netherlands; E-mail: joris.gijsenbergh@ru.nl
Submitted: 17 December 2020 | Accepted: 4 March 2021 | Published: 31 March 2021
Abstract
This article analyses how transparency became a buzzword in the European Union (EU) and its predecessors. In order
to do so, it examines how the European Parliament (EP), the European Commission, the Court of Justice, and earlier
European institutions responded to whistleblowing, between 1957 and 2002. In 2019, the EP agreed to encourage and pro-
tect whistleblowers. However, whistleblowing is far from a recent phenomenon. Historical examples include Louis Worms
(1957), Stanley Adams (1973), and Paul van Buitenen (1998). Based on policy documents and parliamentary debates, this
article studies the attitudes and reactions within European institutions towards whistleblowing. Their responses to unau-
thorized disclosures show how their views on openness developed from the beginning of European integration. Such cases
sparked debate on whether whistleblowers deserved praise for revealing misconduct, or criticism for breaching corporate
and political secrecy. In addition, whistleblowing cases urged politicians and officials to discuss how valuable transparency
was, and whether the public deserved to be informed. This article adds a historical perspective to the multidisciplinary
literature on whistleblowing. Both its focus on the European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community,
and EU and its focus on changing attitudes towards transparency provide an important contribution to this multidisci-
plinary field.
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1. Introduction
In 2019, the European Parliament (EP) and the Council
of the European Union adopted minimum standards
‘ensuring that whistleblowers are protected effectively’
in all Member States of the European Union (EU;
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 23 October 2019, 2019, p. 17). Several politi-
cians, activists, and scholars regard this as a momen-
tous turning point. Věra Jourová, Commissioner for
Values and Transparency, called this Directive ‘a game
changer’ (European Commission, 2018). Transparency
International EU (2019) spoke of ‘a historic day for those
who wish to expose corruption and wrongdoing.’ And
according to legal scholar Abazi (2019, p. 93), the EU had
nowentered ‘a newera for protection ofwhistleblowers.’
These reactions raise several questions: Is the current
appreciation for whistleblowing really unprecedented?
And where does this favourable attitude towards trans-
parency come from?
From the 1990s, scholars of European integration
have scrutinized the level of transparency within the
EU. Most of them combine an analytical and a nor-
mative approach. They analyse how European institu-
tions thought about openness and how they put their
views into practice. In addition, these authors offer their
own views, discussing whether transparency is a pre-
condition for a healthy democracy, whether the EU is
too opaque, and, if so, how this state of affairs should
be remedied.
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The dominant narrative is that the EU and its pre-
decessors have a poor track record when it comes to
open government. Many scholars complain that it took
decades before politicians and officials deemed trans-
parency and democracy as sources of legitimacy. In
this view, European institutions only opened their doors
after the Maastricht Treaty (Sternberg, 2013, pp. 128–
152). The appreciation for whistleblowers came even
later, in the twenty-first century, according to Abazi
(2019, pp. 92–98). In addition to the tardiness of the
transparency campaign, critics complain about its inef-
fectiveness. Curtin and Hillebrandt (2016, pp. 190–191,
201–208) warn that the measures implemented by the
EU to improve transparency could be circumvented. For
that reason, sceptics question the sincerity of politi-
cians and officials who call for openness (Shore, 2000,
pp. 212–219).
Other scholars are less sceptical. They, too, focus on
the period from 1992, but stress that the EU has contin-
ually done its best to improve its communication. They
acknowledge that the measures designed to increase
transparency were not perfect, either because they
failed to produce full disclosure, or because they were
aimed at paternalistically “informing” citizens about the
value of European integration. Nevertheless, these schol-
ars applaud the EU for its genuine attempts to open up.
Pukallus (2016, p. 153) states that there is ‘little doubt-
ing the laudable nature of the ambition of an advanced
bureaucracy trying to adopt a policy of debate and dia-
logue, accompanied by a philosophy of transparency.’
Some historians add that the call for the democratiza-
tion of the European institutions preceded the EU. They
claim that European institutions had already started wor-
rying about their democratic legitimacy in the 1950s, but
merely defined democracy differently than present-day
scholars. These studies focus on debates about represen-
tation (van Zon, 2019, pp. 9–11). The question remains
whether the call for transparency also originated in
the early days of European integration, and whether it
was explicitly linked to democracy. According to Keane
(2011), citizens worldwide were already demanding a
‘monitory democracy’ in 1945, claiming the right to scru-
tinise their governments. However, he has not focused
on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
the European Economic Community (EEC), or the EU.
Historical research on European transparency is still
in its infancy (Engels & Monier, 2020, p. 8). This is
evenmore true of whistleblowing research (Gijsenbergh,
2020, p. 174).
Building on this literature, this article analyses how
Members of the EP (MEPs), the European Commission
(henceforth the Commission), the Court of Justice
(henceforth the Court), and preceding institutions
thought about transparency from the start of European
integration. In addition, this study examines whether
they associated openness with democracy. In order to
do so, this article focuses on their responses to whistle-
blowing. Whistleblowers caused a dilemma: On the one
hand, their disclosures of wrongdoing might serve the
public interest, but on the other hand their unauthorized
breaches of secrecy could be deemed illegitimate. Like
many recent historians, I refrain from a normative point
of view. Instead, I examine the attitudes, behaviour, argu-
ments, and discourse of politicians and officials of the
ECSC, EEC, and EU. Who applauded and who criticized
whistleblowers? Did they take protective or disciplinary
measures? Which arguments pro and contra whistle-
blowing were used? Did the debates revolve around the
scandals, the fate of the whistleblowers, or the value
of openness (Horn, 2011, p. 104)? And did politicians
and officials claim that the public had a ‘right to know’
(Schudson, 2015)? Lastly, when did European institu-
tions adopt the term “whistleblower”? The use of this
metaphor, with its positive ‘image of regulation and
fairness,’ reflects when whistleblowing was recognized
(Gurman &Mistry, 2020, pp. 11–15). Moreover, this con-
ceptual history reveals whether whistleblowers were
explicitly celebrated as a ‘democratic icon’ (Olesen, 2018,
pp. 516–520). The analysis is based on policy documents
and parliamentary sources, including minutes of plenary
debates and committeemeetings, petitions, reports, and
judgements of the Court. Quotes from French, German,
and Dutch sources have been translated into English by
the author.
Three cases have been selected: LouisWorms (1957),
Stanley Adams (1973), and Paul van Buitenen (1998).
They fall within the definition of ‘whistleblower’ by Lewis,
Brown, and Moberly (2014, p. 4): ‘an organizational or
institutional “insider” who reveals wrongdoing within or
by that organization or institution, to someone else, with
the intention or effect that action should thenbe taken to
address it.’ Each of these cases were related to European
institutions, albeit to a different degree. This is especially
true of Van Buitenen, a civil servant of the EUwho forced
the Santer Commission to resignwhen he disclosed fraud
and a cover-up. Scrap dealer Worms blew the whistle on
the High Authority (HA) of the ECSC, by revealing that
its bureau in charge of regulating the scrap market had
turned a blind eye to a scandal. Adams differs somewhat.
When he uncovered wrongdoing in a private company,
he saw the EEC as an ally, rather than the culprit. Still,
Adams is relevant for this article. Similar to the other two
cases, he forced MEPs, the Commission, and the Court
to discuss whether they should defend whistleblowers
and the free flow of information. By spilling secrets, all
three whistleblowers compelled European institutions
to express what they really felt about openness. These
cases are more insightful than the existing literature,
which focuses on transparency campaigns that were initi-
ated, controlled, and sometimes circumvented by these
institutions (Meijer, 2014, p. 511).
These cases reveal long-term developments in the
attitudes towards transparency. Little is known about
whistleblowing during the first 50 years of European
integration. During the first decades of this period,
Worms, Adams, and Van Buitenen seem to be the only
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high-profile whistleblowers involved with European insti-
tutions. That is a contrast with the twenty-first cen-
tury. In the first decade after Van Buitenen’s disclo-
sure alone, seven whistleblowing EU operatives received
widespread attention (Directorate-General for Internal
Policies, 2011, p. 27). Nevertheless, whistleblowing does
have deeper roots: Americans already coined the con-
cept in the 1970s, and the practice of whistleblowing
is probably even older. Earlier cases in the ECSC, EEC,
and EU may have escaped scholarly attention, if the
people involved were not called “whistleblowers” at the
time. This is all the more reason to examine the devel-
opment of attitudes within the European institutions
towards whistleblowing. For the purpose of this arti-
cle, Worms, Adams, and Van Buitenen suffice. These
major cases represent three waves in the call for trans-
parency: the 1950s/1960s, the 1970s, and the 1990s
(Schudson, 2015). After discussing these cases in chrono-
logical order, the conclusion elaborates on what my
historical approach contributes to the multidisciplinary
scholarship on transparency and European integration.
2. Louis Worms (1957–1984)
In its early years, the ECSC struggled with a shortage
of scrap metal. In order to guarantee a steady sup-
ply of this crucial raw material for the steel indus-
try, the HA and steel manufacturers offered importers
financial compensation. They established an equalisa-
tion fund, which was managed by the Office Commun
des Consommateurs de Ferraille (OCCF). The supervision
by the HA over this organisation of scrap dealers and
consumers remained limited (Díaz-Morlán&Sáez-García,
2020, pp. 1–10). This system proved susceptible to fraud.
Several scrap dealers, steel manufacturers, and civil ser-
vants passed domestic scrap for imported scrap, pocket-
ing the compensation. In 1957, the Dutch scrap dealer
Louis Worms reported the swindlers to the OCCF and
the HA. Frustrated by their slow response, he petitioned
the European Parliamentary Assembly and its succes-
sor, the European Parliament (for brevity’s sake, both
institutes will be abbreviated as EP, even though the
title “European Parliament” was not adopted until 1962).
Worms called the HA and the OCCF ‘accomplices’ of
the fraudsters, accusing them of keeping the scandal
under the lid with a toothless investigation. He especially
blamed Vice-President Dirk Spierenburg for this ‘fail-
ure of supranational authority’ (Worms, 1958, pp. 4–5;
Worms, 1966, pp. 2–3, 7).
These allegations forced the HA and the EP to dis-
cuss the matter at length. Prominent MEPs felt that
the fraud called for a serious investigation. EP-President
Hans Furler stressed that ‘the scrap affair shows that
the Parliament intends to conduct its monitory tasks’
(“Debate,” 1960b, p. 997). This was confirmed when
Spierenburg had a conflictwith his fiercest critic,Marinus
van der Goes van Naters. When this Social Democratic
MEP rumoured that the Vice-President might be com-
plicit in the fraud, Spierenburg refused to attend com-
mittee meetings with him. In response, various party
groups condemned Spierenburg for avoiding parlia-
mentary control. EP-Vice-President Leopoldo Rubinacci
reminded him to respect the ‘parliamentary preroga-
tives’ (“Debate,” 1961a, p. 82). In his memoires, Van der
Goes vanNaters (1980, p. 271) boasted: ‘finally therewas
a real parliamentary debate in the Maison de l’Europe.’
This assertive attitude towards the HAwas extraordinary,
at a time when a culture of consensus demanded a con-
structive attitude of MEPs (van Zon, 2019, pp. 175–192).
All debates about Worms’ disclosures revolved
around the way the HA handled the fraud and the scrap
market. Most MEPs were not as critical as Worms or Van
der Goes vanNaters. They believed that Spierenburgwas
not involved in the affair, and that he had (eventually)
done his best to investigate the abuses. However, they
were disappointed that the HA had been unaware of
the fraud until Worms blew the whistle. Looking back in
1961, they concluded that the HA should have kept the
OCCF on a tighter leash. Rapporteur Alain Poher (1961,
p. 2) reminded the HA that ‘the Common Assembly had
already been complaining since 1956 that “laisser-faire”
policies were adopted too often.’ The rest of the EP con-
curred and advised theHA to exertmore control in future
(“Debate,” 1961c, p. 173). The HA reached a different
conclusion. According to Vice-President Albert Coppé,
too much governmental intervention in the economy
would only lead tomore ‘abuse’ (“Debate,” 1961b, p. 39).
Worms’ plight attracted far less attention than the
scrap policy of the ECSC. That is remarkable, consider-
ing that he suffered dire consequences for signalling the
violations. He lost his job as a sales representative for
Krupp-Hansa, one of the fraudulent companies. In addi-
tion, Worms claimed that his own company was being
boycotted by his spiteful peers in the industry. He even
feared that he might be liquidated by ‘gangsters who
wanted to keep me quiet’ (Worms, 1980, pp. 20–21).
Nevertheless, Worms did not find many support-
ers in Brussels and Luxembourg. Both the OCCF and
the HA were too affronted to help him. Vice-President
Coppé reminded the MEPs of the ‘irksome personal
character of his accusations,’ to explain why ‘we did
not immediately welcome Mr Worms with open arms’
(“Debate,” 1961b, p. 60). Spierenburg could not agree
more. He never explicitly praised the whistleblower.
Instead, he downplayed the importance of his revela-
tions, calling his evidence ‘legally inadequate’ (“Debate,”
1960a, pp. 722–723). Furthermore, he assured theMEPs
that ‘no evidence whatsoever had been found that
Worms had been discriminated against’ (Commissie voor
de Interne Markt, 1959a, p. 31). According to Van
der Goes van Naters (1980, p. 272), Spierenburg even
abused his position as Permanent Representative of
the Netherlands to the EEC to sabotage Worms’ migra-
tion to France in 1963. Neither did the Court help
Worms. He demanded financial compensation, argu-
ing that the HA should have acted against his boycott.
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However, the Court dismissed his claim and forced him
to pay the legal fees, exacerbating his debts (Louis
Worms v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel
Community, 1962).
Therefore, Worms turned to the EP for aid. TheMEPs
were not deaf toWorms’ pleas, but neither did they offer
him their full support. His staunchest ally was Van der
Goes van Naters, who praised Worms for his ‘coura-
geous denunciation’ (“Debate,” 1961b, p. 54). He was
appalled that the whistleblower faced the ‘inexorable
hatred’ of other scrap dealers (“Debate,” 1960a, p. 731).
He also criticized the HA: ‘We deeply regret that the
report did not sufficiently recognize the important role
that Mr. Worms played in setting in motion and con-
tinuing an investigation into the scrap fraud’ (van der
Goes van Naters, 1961, p. 14). Although Van der Goes
van Naters was backed by other Social Democrats, his
drive made him a ‘loner’ in Strasbourg (Mreijen, 2018,
p. 230). Most MEPs followed the more moderate line of
Poher, leader of the Christian Democrats and rapporteur
of two committees on the scrap affair. He acknowledged
that the fraud was a serious matter, but refused to ‘wal-
low in sensationalism’ (“Debate,” 1961a, p. 22). Poher
applauded Worms for performing ‘a very great service
to the Community’ (Commissie voor de Interne Markt,
1959b, p. 3) and expressed his ‘gratitude’ (“Debate,”
1961b, p. 31). However, as far as he was concerned, that
settled thematter. Poher refused to compensateWorms,
because he was not convinced that the scrap dealer had
been boycotted. Other MEPs were even less supportive,
and left the plenary hall whenWorms’ fate was being dis-
cussed (Worms, 1966, p. 3).
It took over 20 years before the MEPs changed their
opinion. Worms’ case was put on the agenda again
when he sent a new petition to the EP, emboldened
by a financial compensation by the Dutch Parliament
(Worms, 1980). Social Democratic rapporteur Hellmut
Sieglerschmidt (1982, pp. 5–6, 16–18) argued that the
EP should follow suit. Considering that Worms had
served the Community and had probably been boy-
cotted, he deserved financial redress and a ‘moral reha-
bilitation.’ The rest of the MEPs agreed and forced the
Commission to compensate Worms, against its express
wishes (“Debate,” 1983, pp. 294–295, 304–305).
Strikingly, the value of transparency was rarely explic-
itly invoked. Above all, Worms’ supporters applauded
him for protecting the economic interests of the duped
‘steel manufacturers who contributed to the equalisa-
tion fund,’ as well as ‘the consumers of the Community’
(van der Goes van Naters, 1961, p. 1). Poher added
another argument in 1959: By reporting the swindlers,
Worms had saved ‘the Community’s reputation’ from
harm (Sieglerschmidt, 1982, p. 16). Only a few Social
Democrats portrayed Worms as a hero of openness.
Van der Goes van Naters stressed that ‘the public…has
the right to be fully informed’ (“Debate,” 1958, p. 234).
For decades, this argument in favour of whistleblow-
ing was rarely used, until Sieglerschmidt repeated it.
He defended compensation for Worms as a means ‘to
encourage people to report such information in future’
(“Debate,” 1983, p. 294). All this time, even these MEPs
never used the term “whistleblower.”
Other politicians and officials discussed how the
HA and the EP, rather than whistleblowers, should
inform the public. Dutch MEPs organised press confer-
ences ‘to consolidate the confidence that the peoples
of Europe intend to grant our institutions’ (“Debate,”
1961b, p. 43). However, this form of communication was
contested, especially when scandals were openly dis-
cussed. Poher preferred the ‘serenity’ of the parliamen-
tary arena (“Debate,” 1961a, p. 23), while Spierenburg
lectured: ‘it is in this European Parliamentary Assembly
that the case must be dealt with publicly, because the
High Authority is only accountable for its actions to your
Parliamentary Assembly’ (“Debate,” 1961b, p. 35).
The discourse and arguments used by the European
institutions suggest that transparency was not their
prime concern. That is understandable, considering the
technocratic nature of the ECSC. According to most
politicians and officials, the ECSC derived its legitimacy
from its ability to solve economic issues. As a result,
decision-making was deemedmore important than polit-
ical deliberation (Sternberg, 2013, pp. 30–39). If politi-
cians and officials discussed the role of the public at all,
they talked about workers and consumers with socio-
economic rights. They did not yet envision informed
citizens who would monitor the European institutions
(Pukallus, 2016, pp. 39–92).
3. Stanley Adams (1973–1985)
When Stanley Adams became World Product Manager
at the pharmaceutical company Hoffmann-La Roche, he
learned that this Swiss multinational was guilty of price-
fixing. In 1973, Adams informed the Commission of these
malpractices, hoping that it would use its new free
trade agreement with Switzerland to stop his employer.
His disclosure led to Adams’ own ruin, because his
contact in Brussels inadvertently revealed the identity
of the whistleblower to Hoffmann-La Roche. Promptly,
the corporation filed serious charges against its former
employee: Under Swiss law, breaching trade secrets to
a foreign power amounted to espionage and treason.
Adams’ wife committed suicide, after the Swiss police
detained him and told her that he might face 20 years
in jail. In 1976, Adams was sentenced to twelve months’
imprisonment, suspended for three years. His attempts
to start a new life in Italy were frustrated by right-wing
politicians, who were antagonised by his criticism of
another scandal surrounding Hoffmann-La Roche, in the
Italian town of Seveso. They withdrew subsidies for
Adams’ farm and accused him of defrauding the govern-
ment. Adams served two months in prison and became
almost bankrupt. Unable to support his daughters, he
was forced to send them away. They were not reunited
until 1981, when Adams fled to Britain (Adams, 1985).
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For ten years, Adams’ case was a ‘cause célèbre’
(“Debate,” 1975, p. 21). Various MEPs raised the matter
until 1985, when the Court ruled that the Commission
should compensate Adams. In marked contrast to the
debates about the scrap fraud, thewhistleblower himself
was now the centre of attention, rather than the scan-
dal he uncovered. Several MEPs emphasised Adams’ sac-
rifices in service of the EEC, and urged the Commission
to alleviate his suffering. Like Worms, Adams could
rely the most on Social Democrats. John Prescott took
the lead. He repeatedly emphasised that ‘no one faces
the personal consequences that Mr Adams himself
has faced.’ Moreover, he stressed that Adams ‘assisted
the Commission considerably in providing information.’
Therefore, he concluded: ‘The least that we can do is to
assist him’ (“Debate,” 1977, pp. 109–110).
Adams’ supporters could also be found outside
the Social Democratic ranks. Compared to Worms, he
enjoyed more widespread assistance. In a historic show
of unity, the EP unanimously adopted a resolution in
Adams’ favour in 1980. It called upon the Commission to
offer him financial compensation, and to negotiate with
the Swiss and Italian authorities to clear his name. This
Parliament-wide consensus was a first in the history of
the institute (Adams, 1985, p. 164). All MEPs followed
the conclusion of a committee representing all party
groups and countries, led by Liberal rapporteur Georges
Donnez (1980, pp. 15–16):
It is clear that the European Community has a partic-
ular responsibility to Mr Adams, whose statements
enabled practices contrary to the EEC-Switzerland
trade agreement and the EEC Treaty to be punished
and stopped. Mr Adams has suffered considerable
misfortune in his personal and family life as well as
substantial financial loss….Therefore the community
must act to help Mr Adams.
The Commission, too, showed its gratitude to Adams,
but did not go as far as the MEPs. Its Competition
Department did, however, eagerly use Adams’ infor-
mation in order to fine Hoffmann-La Roche. Moreover,
Vice-President Wilhelm Haferkamp assured the EP ‘that
we are all aware of the unfortunate and tragic per-
sonal side of this case’ (“Debate,” 1977, p. 111). For
that reason, the Commission covered Adams’ legal
costs, amounting to more than 100,000 Swiss francs.
In response to the Donnez report, moreover, the
Commission added another 50 million lire. However,
it refused to offer a larger financial contribution, and
made Adams promise to refrain from further claims.
Adams felt forced to accept that stipulation, now that
his debts threatened to send him back to prison (Adams,
1985, pp. 167–170). Neither was the Commission will-
ing to ask the Swiss and Italian authorities for amnesty.
Vice-President Lorenzo Natali upheld the rule ‘not to
interfere in the jurisdiction of the judicial authori-
ties of third countries’ (“Debate,” 1980, pp. 346–347).
Furthermore, the Commission did not relent whenMEPs
continued to plead for more financial and legal help in
the following years.
That changed in 1985, a year after Worms
was compensated. The Court held the Commission
co-responsible for revealing Adams’ name to Hoffmann-
La Roche. It also blamed Adams himself, because he had
‘failed to inform the Commission that it was possible to
infer his identity as the informant’ from the documents
that he had leaked. Therefore, the Court ruled that the
Commission and Adams should both pay one half of the
damages suffered by the whistleblower (Stanley George
Adams v. Commission of the European Communities,
1985, p. 3592).
A marked difference with the debates about Worms,
was that the importance of transparency was more
explicitly addressed during the debates about Adams.
Prescott hoped that ‘the right of information in this
Community about the actions of multinationals will
be upheld in the near future’ (“Debate,” 1979, p. 82).
Support for Adams was meant to achieve that goal.
Raymond Forni invited the Commission ‘to see to it that
justice is done to him so that other citizens will not
be discouraged but will continue to provide information
on the attitude and behaviour of multinational compa-
nies within the European Community’ (“Debate,” 1979,
p. 84). Adams (1985, p. 228) himself also hoped that he
could serve as an example to ‘all those other potential
whistle-blowers.’
However, it would go too far to argue that the
European institutions now embraced openness as the
pillar of the EEC’s legitimacy. Unlike Adams, they did
not adopt the concept of ‘whistleblowing.’ Instead, they
used more neutral terms. While the Court spoke of
‘the Commission’s informant’ (Stanley George Adams
v. Commission of the European Communities, 1985,
p. 3558), MEP Bodril Kathrine Boserup referred to ‘dis-
closures of confidential information’ (as cited in Adams,
1985, p. 205). More importantly, when MEPs and
Commissioners underscored the importance of trans-
parency, they did not talk about the right of citizens
to scrutinize the European institutions. Rather, they
defended the right of European institutions to moni-
tor multinationals. European institutions needed to be
informed about malpractices, in order to enforce the
rules in the commonmarket. Under the free trade agree-
ment, those rules also applied to Swiss corporations.
However, by convicting Adams, the Swiss court implied
that the Swiss legal protection of trade secrets took
precedence over the trade agreement. Prescott com-
plained that ‘the Commission, which has the responsi-
bility to investigate breaches of the regulations under
the Rome Treaty and the competitive clauses, is denied
essential information’ (“Debate,” 1976a, p. 262).
The widespread attention and support for Adams
can be partly explained by the strong consumer activism
in the 1970s, coupled with a growing unease with the
power of multinationals. Hoffmann-La Roche had an
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especially bad reputation after the Seveso affair. MEP
Ludwig Fellermaier praised Adams for his attempt ‘to
combat practices which are contrary to the rules of
competition and detrimental to millions of consumers
throughout Europe’ (“Debate,” 1976b, p. 69). BothMEPs
and Commissioners lent an ear to consumer organisa-
tions (van de Grift, 2018). Their willingness to listen to
these organisations fits within a trend that existed dur-
ing the 1970s/1980s. European institutions promised to
take the expectations of the peoples of the EEC into
consideration, in order to downplay their technocratic
image. The attempt to involve the public more actively
in the decision-making process was epitomised by the
direct elections of MEPs from 1979. Inhabitants of the
EEC were now styled as “European citizens” with civil
rights. Especially their right to participate in the electoral
process was stressed. European institutions also gradu-
ally informed citizens about the Community’s affairs, but
the public’s right to know did not yet receive as much
emphasis as its right to vote (Pukallus, 2016, pp. 93–133;
Sternberg, 2013, pp. 46–61, 76–102).
4. Paul van Buitenen (1998–2002)
In the late 1990s, the EU was shaken to its core by
a whistleblowing case. Paul van Buitenen, an assistant
auditor in the Financial Control Directorate, discovered
irregularities in several EU programmes. When his inter-
nal reports were ignored, he turned to the Green MEPs
in 1998. He accused Commissioner Édith Cresson and
other high-ranking officials of fraud and a cover-up.
In response, the EP instated a Committee of Wise Men
to investigate the matter. This Committee corroborated
Van Buitenen’s allegations. The entire Commission felt
forced to resign, which had never happened before.
Once again, MEPs used a whistleblowing case to test
their strength with the executive power. And once again,
the whistleblower did not escape unscathed. Before
leaving office, the Santer Commission temporarily sus-
pended Van Buitenen with deduction of pay. The Prodi
Commission followed this course, by reprimanding the
whistleblower for a breach of confidentiality. After his
suspension, the Human Resources Department did not
allow him to return to his old job, claiming that his
relations with his former colleagues had been soured.
Van Buitenen was transferred to several other EU agen-
cies, where he could no longer exercise his talents or
interest in financial auditing. To Van Buitenen, this felt
as an unjustified penalty (van Buitenen, 2000, 2004).
The reactions to Van Buitenen’s disclosure indicate
that many EU politicians and officials shared his distaste
of the culture of secrecy within the Commission. First,
most MEPs were more agitated by the sanctions against
Van Buitenen than by the fraud itself. At first, his revela-
tions hardly caused a stir. The real controversy started
when the Commission had disciplined Van Buitenen.
Magda Aelvoet, leader of the Greens and the first MEP
Van Buitenen had informed about the fraud, pointed out:
‘it is not the fact that this case came to light, but the
fact that this suspension came to light which called forth
a storm of protest’ (“Debate,” 1999a, p. 12). Now that
Van Buitenen had become ‘symbolic of the fight against
fraud in Europe’ (“Debate,” 1999c), he was revered as
a martyr. A wide variety of MEPs repeatedly urged
the Commission to rehabilitate the auditor. His most
vocal supporters were the Greens, other left-wing party
groups, and Eurosceptics, as well as some Liberals and
Christian Democrats. According to Johannes Blokland, for
example, ‘this whistle-blower deserves the very opposite
of a reprimand’ (“Debate,” 1999d). In contrast to Worms
and Adams, Van Buitenen was not immediately backed
by Social Democrats. They even watered down a resolu-
tion that called for his re-instatement, showing their loy-
alty to the Social Democratic Commissioners. However,
they eventually joined the chorus of Van Buitenen’s
supporters. Michiel van Hulten declared: ‘He has been
called a hero of European democracy, with good reason’
(“Debate,” 2002a).
Second, Van Buitenen’s case gave rise to the first pro-
tective measures for whistleblowers in the EU. Triggered
by his fate, MEPs of various political affiliations fre-
quently requested these measures. Van Hulten saw ‘rules
to protect whistle-blowers’ as ‘the key to restoring
the confidence of the people of Europe in our institu-
tions’ (“Debate,” 2000). As new Vice-President in charge
of the administrative reform of the EU, Neil Kinnock
promised to consider ‘legal protection for “whistle-
blowers’’’ (European Parliament, 1999). He built upon a
recent decision of the Santer Commission, which obli-
gated all officials and servants of theCommission to report
illegal activities to their superiors or to the European Anti-
Fraud Office (Commission Decision of 2 June 1999, 1999).
Kinnock added that external whistleblowing would also
be protected, provided that whistleblowers would only
turn to the Court of Auditors, the Council of the European
Union, the EP, or the European Ombudsman, and would
first exhaust all internal reporting channels (Commission
of the European Communities, 2000b, p. 47; Commission
of the European Communities, 2002).
Third, discursive changes confirm that the value of
transparency was increasingly recognized in Brussels
and Strasbourg. The term “whisteblowing” was now
en vogue. Van Buitenen used it frequently in his book
Blowing the whistle and in his correspondence with
MEPs. By calling himself ‘a genuine whistleblower,’
Van Buitenen (2000, p. 177) hoped to gain their sym-
pathy. Various party groups copied this terminology.
In their recurring debates about ‘the much-discussed
“whistle-blower” question’ (“Debate,” 1999e), MEPs
spoke in glowing terms about insiders who disclosedmal-
practices. Kinnock, too, often referred to ‘the question
of whistleblowers’ (“Debate,” 1999c). The Vice-President
appreciated whistleblowing, but sounded more ambiva-
lent than most MEPs. Kinnock told them that he sought
‘a fair balance between the right to protection of
the whistleblower’ and ‘the right of those accused
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of fraudulent behaviour’ to a fair trial (Answer given
by Mr Kinnock on behalf of the Commission, 2002).
Moreover, Kinnock denied that Van Buitenen (2000,
pp. 226–228) was a real whistleblower. Nevertheless,
this attempt to delegitimize the auditor confirms that the
term “whistleblower” had become an honorific.
In addition, references to “transparency” increased.
Kinnock used this term (including the term “transpar-
ent”) no less than 21 times in his consultative docu-
ment “Reforming the Commission” (Commission of the
European Communities, 2000a). Other Commissioners
also assured the EP that ‘Democracy and openness are
essential principles which the Commission values and
seeks to put into practice’ (“Debate,” 2002b). MEPs also
extolled the virtues of transparency. Van Buitenen’s case
aggravated them, partly because the Santer Commision
had withheld information from the EP. Diemut Theato
exclaimed: ‘We have a right to information (“Debate,”
1999b). In addition, MEPs now also underlined that cit-
izens were entitled to information. Olle Schmidt wel-
comed ‘more open and transparent communication
within the Commission, between the various institu-
tions and with the public’ (“Debate,” 1999f). MEPs asso-
ciated transparency with democratization. Nelly Maes
expressed this widespread sentiment: ‘The call for more
openness and transparency is closely bound up with the
call for more democracy that is ringing out loud and clear
across Europe, not least in relation to the institutions of
the European Community’ (“Debate,” 1999e).
The appreciation for Van Buitenen and whistleblow-
ing should be understood against the background of a
general call formore transparency and democracywithin
the EU. This trend had started in the early 1990s, in
response to growing Euroscepticism. European institu-
tions opened their doors, by simplifying bureaucratic
procedures, granting the public access to policy docu-
ments, and engaging in dialogue. The hope was that
citizens would become more involved, if they were
better informed. The new dominant understanding of
“European citizenship” entitled citizens to information.
In addition to their right to participate in the process of
parliamentary scrutiny, citizens also deserved to engage
in public deliberation and to hold the authorities to
account (Pukallus, 2016, pp. 135–168). European institu-
tions ‘re-imagined democracy in terms of openness and
transparency as opposed to, say, popular participation or
parliamentary accountability’ (Sternberg, 2013, p. 151).
They presented openness ‘as a remedy to the so-called
“democratic deficit” that is a legacy of the late 1950s’
(Kratz, 1999, p. 387).
5. Conclusions
A comparison of the reactions by European institutions
to Worms, Adams, and Van Buitenen shows that whistle-
blowing and transparency have beenon the agenda since
the beginning of European integration, albeit not always
prominently. These high-profile cases followed a gen-
eral pattern. All three whistleblowers uncovered scan-
dals and cover-ups involving private companies and/or
Community officials, and reported these malpractices
to European institutions. They also turned to these
institutions for help against their vindictive opponents.
In response, the EP, the HA, the Commission, and the
Court discussed whether they should support whistle-
blowers, or reprimand them for their unauthorized dis-
closures. In addition, whistleblowing raised the question
of who deserved to be informed: European institutions
and/or the public? This means that the EU Directive of
23 October 2019 on the protection of whistleblowers
did not come out of the blue. Rather, it should be seen
as a new phase in an ongoing debate about openness,
starting in the 1950s. This long-time span shows that
the attention for transparency has deeper roots than has
been assumed by scholars who limit their analysis to the
1990s or the twenty-first century. My historical study of
this rich tradition puts the novelty of current events into
a long-term perspective (Kaiser, 2009, p. 27).
Nevertheless, the views on transparency in the
ECSC, EEC, and EU have changed significantly. Shifts
occurred in the attitudes, behaviour, arguments, and
discourse of the European institutions. The differences
between the three cases outweigh their similarities.
In the 1950s/1960s, the EP and the HA rarely recognized
the public’s right to know. Politicians and officials were
more interested in the scrap affair itself than in Worms’
predicament, and only a few key MEPs championed his
cause. A shift happened in the 1970s/1980s. In this
period, European institutions addressed Worms’ case
again and became concerned about Adams’ fate. Adams
had more supporters than Worms had had, includ-
ing all MEPs and the Court. MEPs and Commissioners
now emphasised the value of transparency more explic-
itly, although they meant that they deserved infor-
mation themselves. Adams even introduced the con-
cept of “whistleblower,” although more neutral terms
remained common. The call for openness increased
in intensity during the 1990s. MEPs of all stripes
applauded Van Buitenen for his self-sacrificing disclo-
sure. Furthermore, the Commission set in motion the
first whistleblowing protection for EU officials. What’s
more, “transparency” and “whistleblowing” becamebuz-
zwords. For the first time, these concepts were explic-
itly linked to democracy, based on the idea that citizens
deserved to be informed. Shore (2000, p. 6) is too cyni-
cal when he deduces from Van Buitenen’s case that the
European institutions were still characterised by a ‘cul-
ture of collusion and secrecy.’ In comparison to their
predecessors in the 1950s/1960s and 1970s/1980s, both
Commissioners andMEPs now defended whistleblowing
and the value of openness more vocally.
The increasing appreciation for whistleblowing and
transparency can be explained by the changing views on
the relationship between the ECSC/EEC/EU and the pub-
lic. Above all, the institutions of the ECSC valued exper-
tise and efficiency as sources of their output legitimacy.
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Political participation mattered less to them, let alone
the public’s right to know. Openness was more valued in
the 1970s/1980s, when European institutions required
information to monitor multinationals on behalf of con-
sumers. Looking for a counterweight to their techno-
cratic image, European institutions treated the peo-
ples of the EEC as citizens with the right to be heard
(mainly through the parliamentary process). However,
citizens’ right to be informed still received less emphasis.
That changed in the 1990s, because politicians and offi-
cials hoped that better-informed citizens would become
more involved in the European integration process.
They now framed transparency as a panacea against
Euroscepticism and the EU’s perceived lack of demo-
cratic legitimacy (Pukallus, 2016; Sternberg, 2013).
Insight into these long-term developments is impor-
tant for the future of transparency. We cannot take cur-
rent attitudes towards openness for granted. The notion
that citizens have a “right to know” developed only
gradually. If we want to make the EU more account-
able, we need to ensure that politicians and officials
are convinced of the importance of openness. In order
to do that, we have to study which political and orga-
nizational culture is conducive to transparent politics.
Historical research can help, by showing under which cir-
cumstances the call for transparency caught on. This arti-
cle has offered a modest start. Comparative follow-up
studies would be welcome. Historians should join hands
with legal scholars and social scientists, who study the
impact of culture on attitudes towards whistleblowing
from a more theoretical perspective (Vandekerckhove,
Uys, Rehg, & Brown, 2014).
Historical research is also valuable for the future of
the EU. This article examined how the perceptions of
transparency among politicians and officials have shifted
over time. That is important, because their attitudes
and behaviour have shaped—and continue to shape—
European integration. Here, too, there is room for fur-
ther research. Historians could study the public opin-
ion on whistleblowing. Sources abound: Whistleblowers
often received letters of support, media attention, and
the assistance of advocacy groups. This source mate-
rial would put the debates within the European insti-
tutions in context, by showing whether they ignored,
followed, and/or shaped public sentiment. Moreover,
these sources could tell us what citizens expected from
the ECSC, EEC, and EU, and whether disclosures of
scandals caused Euroscepticism. Again, historians should
cooperate with other disciplines, which offer theories
about the impact of transparency on distrust (Abazi
& Tauschinsky, 2015). In short, the history of whistle-
blowing provides insight into past developments, current
views, and future mentalities.
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